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The Alignment of Partnering Strategy, Governance and Management in 
R&D Projects: The Role of Contract Choice  
 
Abstract 
Firms increasingly look outside their organizational boundaries to identify partners that can improve 
the effectiveness of R&D projects. The strategy for using partners, however, varies significantly across 
projects. In some, partners are used primarily to lower development costs and/or supplement 
development capacity; in others they are used to improve the quality of the final product.  How should 
these variations in partnering strategy impact the governance and management choices made within 
projects?  We examine this question, using data on 172 R&D projects from six different industries.  
We test hypotheses that examine first, how a firm’s choice of contract—whether fixed price, time & 
materials, or performance-based—is shaped by its partnering strategy; and second, how this choice 
subsequently affects the levels of partner integration and partner performance observed in a project.  
Our results indicate that the choice of contract is a function of a firm’s partnering strategy, more 
flexible contracts being preferred in projects that seek long-run capability-based benefits, and where 
partnering relationships are broader in scope.  These choices, in turn, impact the benefits associated 
with partner integration.  In particular, higher levels of partner integration are always associated with 
higher project costs, but are associated with higher product quality only in projects using more flexible 
contract types.  Furthermore, major deviations from the “optimal” choice of contract increase the costs 
and decrease the benefits associated with partner integration. We end by discussing the implications of 
our findings, and suggest new directions for future research. 
 
 
Keywords:  Partnering, Outsourcing, Collaboration, Contract Choice, Distributed Teams, Virtual 
Teams, Product Development, Project Management
Page 2  
 
Introduction 
Over the past two decades, firms have increasingly sought to unbundle their value chain activities 
and collaborate with partners to meet the challenge of increasingly competitive global markets (Sinha 
and Van de Ven 2005, Schilling and Steensma 2001).  Many of their early efforts were devoted to 
identifying the choice of sourcing strategy (i.e., make or buy) for manufacturing the components and 
subsystems that make up a product (Gulati et al. 2005). In the recent years, with partners increasingly 
moving up the value chain, the focus has shifted more toward examining the critical role such firms 
are playing in the design and development of these products (Weigelt 2009, Tiwana 2008, Manning et 
al. 2008).  Recent surveys show that nearly 60-80% of firms deploy partners to a significant extent in 
their R&D projects to achieve their design and development objectives.1,2 
Firms deploy partners in their R&D projects for a number of different reasons.  For many firms, 
partners primarily represent an opportunity to lower R&D costs, given the wage arbitrage 
opportunities that exist between different geographical locations with varying factor costs (Carmel and 
Tija 2005, Rottman and Lacity 2004).  In such “outsourcing” relationships, the partner staff is assumed 
to substitute for the in-house staff by providing similar skills and capabilities at a fraction of the in-
house costs.  In other cases however, firms use partners to enhance product quality. The partner staff is 
assumed to complement in-house resources by providing unique skills and capabilities that are not 
possessed by a firm internally (Lavie and Rosenkopf 2006, Faraj and Sproull 2000). 
This diversity in the roles that partners play in R&D projects raises an important set of questions 
about how partnering relationships should be managed differently across the projects; both, from the 
perspective of determining an appropriate governance structure and an effective process for managing 
project execution (Gerwin and Ferris 2004). Projects focused on lowering development costs are likely 
to require distinct managerial approaches than projects in which enhancing product quality is the main 
objective. Adopting a set of partnering “best practices” that works in every situation is therefore 
infeasible, and may even be hazardous to a firm’s long-term survival. These challenges concerning the 
effective management of partnering relationships in R&D projects are becoming increasingly relevant 
                                                
1 2007 Economist Intelligent Unit Report, “Sharing the Idea: The Emergence of Global Innovation Networks” 
2 2010 Global R&D Funding Forecast, R&D Magazine; Dec. 2009, p. 21 
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and require greater attention, given the wealth of recent evidence which indicates that firms are 
obtaining suboptimal returns from their partnering relationships (A.T. Kearney 2007) 
Prior work on governance has highlighted the role of contracts as governance structures in 
partnered R&D projects, and focused primarily on identifying the choice of contract—from among 
fixed price and time & material contracts—that is suited to the specific attributes of the R&D project 
(Banerjee and Duflo 2000, Gopal et al. 2003). Much of this work is founded upon transaction cost 
economics (TCE) theory, which highlights the role contracts play in establishing suitable incentives 
for partners while protecting the firm against opportunistic behavior (Williamson 1975, 1985). To date 
however, little work has been done in terms of understanding how a firm’s partnering strategy (i.e., in 
terms of the objectives and scope of partner involvement in R&D projects) affects the choice of 
contract. 
A number of studies have also explored the question of how partnered R&D projects can be 
effectively managed (Tiwana 2008, Majchrzak et al. 2004, Chesbrough 2003, Crampton 2001). These 
studies have tended to focus on the optimal partitioning of tasks between a firm and its partners and 
identified factors that facilitate the subsequent integration of partners’ efforts with the firm.  The 
emerging theme from this literature is that the performance of a partnering relationship is higher to the 
degree that a firm and its partners dedicate their staff full-time to the project, have lower levels of staff 
turnover, hold frequent face-to-face meetings, and adopt processes that facilitate knowledge transfer. 
In short, all else being equal, higher levels of partner integration in an R&D project is likely to be 
associated with better performance in the project. This scenario rarely reflects the reality of R&D 
project execution in practice (Haas 2006, Hansen and Nohria 2004). Partnering strategies can vary 
significantly across R&D projects, and such variations can create differences in payoffs from 
integration of partners, across projects. Examining the contingencies which impact the payoffs from 
integration of partners in R&D projects represents a critical step toward effectively managing such 
projects.  
In this paper, we report results from a large sample empirical study of partnered R&D projects.  
Our aim was to develop an understanding of how variations in partnering strategy across R&D 
projects impact the governance and management of such projects. Our conceptual framework asserts 
that different partnering strategies require distinctly different contract choices, and these choices 
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subsequently determine the performance benefits from partnering integration in R&D projects. We test 
these relationships using primary data from a sample of 172 R&D projects across six different 
industries. 
 Our analysis reveals that the choice of contract for an R&D project is a function of (i) the 
partnering objective, and (ii) the scope of partnering relationship in the project—these two factors, 
taken together, constitute a firm’s partnering strategy for the project. Specifically, firms that deploy 
partners in R&D projects to achieve the long-run objectives of accessing unique skills and technical 
capabilities of the partners and gain new market knowledge (relative to the short-run objectives of 
minimizing development costs and supplementing development capacity) are likely to choose time & 
materials or performance-based contracts (relative to fixed price contracts) for their projects. 
Additionally, firms that involve partners over a broader scope of activities in their R&D projects are 
more likely to choose time & materials or performance-based contracts over a fixed price contracts for 
their projects. We also find that while greater levels of partner integration (in terms of partner team 
staffing, communication, and intellectual property sharing) are generally associated with higher 
project costs, they are associated with higher product quality only in projects with time & materials or 
performance-based contracts. Finally, our results demonstrate that R&D projects in which contract 
choices are aligned with partnering strategy are likely to see greater performance benefits from partner 
integration than those in which such choices are misaligned. 
 Our findings make a number of contributions to the extant literature. First, we extend the prior 
literature on contracts and partnering in R&D, by articulating the need for alignment between a firm’s 
partnering strategy for an R&D project and the governance and management of partnering 
relationships in the project. In doing so, we explicitly model the performance trade-offs that come 
from partner integration across different contract choices, capturing their impact on both project costs 
and product quality. We can therefore be more precise about the contexts under which different 
governance and management approaches are beneficial. Second, we extend the analysis of traditional 
models of contract choices (i.e., fixed price and time & materials) by examining performance-based 
contracts—a newer, much less studied form of contract in which a partner’s reward is contingent on 
project performance. Finally, in contrast to the prior literature which has mostly examined contracts in 
samples of projects drawn from a single firm (e.g., Gopal et al. 2003, Mayer and Nickerson 2005, 
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Argyres et al. 2007, Gefen et al. 2008), the empirical analysis in our study is conducted using data 
from a large sample of projects across  multiple firms and multiple industries. This enhances the 
generalizability of the results from our study. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we review the 
literature on partnering relationships in R&D projects and develop a number of hypotheses that relates 
partnering strategy to governance and management in such projects. We then move on to the section 
on research design wherein we describe the data collection approach, the sample, and key variables in 
our analysis. Next, we outline the econometric approach for carrying out the analysis and present 
results from our analysis.  In the final section, we discuss the results from our analysis and highlight 
their implications for theory and practice. Limitations of the study and directions for future research 
are outlined. 
 
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
The last decade has seen an explosion of interest relating to the use of partners to complement in-
house resources and improve the performance of a firm’s R&D projects (Oxley and Sampson 2004, 
Chesbrough 2003, Iansiti1997). Much of the early focus on partnering in R&D projects was on 
lowering the cost of development, an approach that essentially extended the notion of outsourcing 
routine manufacturing jobs to R&D projects (Quinn and Hillmer 1995). More recently however, 
studies have identified a broader variety of different objectives for firms’ partnering relationships, 
from the substitution of skilled staff in high cost locations, to the delivery of new capabilities that a 
firm does not possess internally (Lewin et al. 2009, Koza and Lewin 1998). Indeed, similar changes 
have been observed with respect to the scope of partnering relationships; while many projects focus 
solely on the execution of specific tasks within R&D, others encompass a much broader relationship 
that extends to the production or delivery of the final product or service (Khanna et al. 1998). In sum, 
firms have an increasingly sophisticated array of partnering strategies that can be deployed in any 
given development project. 
The diversity observed in partnering strategies suggests that different approaches are likely to be 
necessary for the governance and management of individual projects. Consider, for example, a project 
in which a partner provides access to critical new technical capabilities (e.g., designing the composite 
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fuselage of a new aircraft). Such a project is inherently more uncertain than one in which a partner 
merely provides additional capacity to supplement (or substitute) in-house resources (e.g., testing the 
cockpit electronics for this aircraft), and is likely to require a different choice of contract than the 
latter. Furthermore, the potential benefits from integrating the partner’s staff more closely into the 
development team will vary significantly across the projects. In the former, this will likely be 
essential; in the latter, it may not be necessary. Surprisingly however, while prior studies have 
explored issues of governance and management within the context of partnered projects, much less is 
known about the role of partnering strategy as a driver of contract choice in a project.  Below, we 
review some of the main contributions in these areas. 
 
The Governance of Partnered Projects 
Contracts have been the subject of considerable theoretical and empirical research in the agency 
theory and the transaction cost economics (TCE) literature. While agency theorists have examined the 
role of contracts as a mechanism for aligning incentives and sharing risks between the principal and 
the agent (Holmstorm 1979, Eisenhardt 1989), TCE scholars have examined the effectiveness of 
contracts in offering protection against opportunistic behavior (Williamson 1975, 1985). Broadly, 
much of the extant literature has studied contracts at the firm-level, in the context of industries that 
require extensive specific investments in physical assets. However, contracts also play a critical role in 
governing complex inter-organizational transactions in knowledge-intensive industries such as high 
technology and software industry (Mayer and Nickerson 2005). Such inter-organizational transactions 
require significant amount of joint technical problem solving and coordination between the firm and 
its partner(s) and are often governed through the use of contracts (Argyres and Mayer 2007). Given 
that the majority of these transactions are organized and executed in the form of projects, an 
understanding of how such transactions can be governed effectively, therefore, requires a closer look 
at understanding the role of contracts at the project-level in such industries. 
 A number of studies have made concerted efforts toward this end to examine contracts at the 
project level (e.g., Banerjee and Duflo 2000, Gopal et al. 2003, Gopal and Sivaramakrishnan 2008, 
Gefen et al. 2008). Two distinct types of contracts, namely fixed price and time & materials contracts, 
have been widely examined in this literature. In a fixed price contract, the firm manages the project 
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from afar, i.e., is not directly involved in project execution. The firm provides detailed requirement 
specifications on the work that is required from a partner as well as delivery timetables. The partner is 
then obliged to execute the project and deliver the final outputs as per the requirements and agreed-
upon timeline for a single fixed payment agreed in advance. Failure to comply often carries a penalty. 
In contrast, in a time & materials contract the firm plays an active role in managing project execution 
along with the partner. While there is a general agreement as to the objectives for the relationship, mid 
course corrections and changes in scope are common. The partner is therefore compensated according 
to their investments in time and related materials. In addition to the two types of contract mentioned 
above, a third type of contract that is becoming increasingly prevalent in R&D projects is a 
performance-based contract. In a performance-based contract there is a clear separation between the 
firm’s expectations of partnering performance and how the partner works in the project (Roels et al. 
2010, Kim et al. 2007). That is, while the contract broadly identifies the performance expectations of 
the firm from its partner, the latter has the flexibility to determine how to fulfill those performance 
expectations (Macfarlan and Mansir 2004). 
 The main objective of this literature, to date, has been to examine how various contextual 
attributes of the project (e.g., requirements uncertainty, project complexity, project size, etc.) as well 
as the attributes of transacting parties (e.g., firm’s past experience, firm size) affect the choice of 
contract.  The underlying assumption is that these variables impact the level of uncertainty faced in 
writing the contract and consequently will impact the ideal type of contract used in a project. For 
example, Gopal et al. (2003) indicate that as the level of requirements uncertainty and project size 
increase, firms are more likely to choose time & materials contracts over fixed price contracts. While 
such a choice increases the possibility of opportunistic behavior by a partner (e.g., performing 
unneeded work), recent studies (e.g., Kalnins and Mayer 2004, Gefen et al. 2008) show that prior 
relationships and business familiarity between a firm and its partner can help to reduce this concern, 
thus increasing the likelihood that a time & materials contract is chosen, all other factors being equal.  
 A central, often implicit, assumption in this literature is that the partnering strategy (i.e., the 
objective and scope of partner involvement) is homogenous or invariant across projects. Furthermore, 
contextual attributes (e.g., project uncertainty, project complexity, project size) are often viewed as 
exogenous variables that are embedded in the task details and information processing structures of the 
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project. In reality, however, the uncertainty facing a project is also a function of the partnering strategy 
adopted in a project, an explicit choice made at the beginning of a project. Consider for example, the 
returns from a partnering strategy which requires access to new technical or market knowledge and 
involves a greater scope of partner involvement. The returns from such a strategy are likely to be 
considerably more distant in time and uncertain compared to a project in which partners are used 
primarily to complete specific tasks at lower cost (Koza and Lewin 1998; Lavie and Rosenkopf 2006). 
Given that the expected returns from partnering relationships in a project are a function of its 
partnering strategy, understanding how contract choices—namely, fixed price contract, time & 
materials contract, and performance-based contracts—can be better aligned with partnering strategy in 
the project is critical toward ensuring its effective governance. This forms the first major focus of our 
study. 
 
The Management of Partnered Projects 
The rapid growth in the use of partners in new product and service development projects has led to 
an increase in research that focuses on how to manage such collaborative relationships.  In contrast to 
prior work on the management of R&D, which emphasize the merits of collocated heavyweight 
project teams drawn from a single organization (Wheelwright and Clark 1992, Allen 1977), these 
studies start with the assumption that a firm’s R&D objectives are often best met in disaggregated 
organizational structures by combining resources from different partners, operating in different regions 
or countries (Koza and Lewin 1998, Santos and Williamson 2004, Eppinger and Chitkara 2006, Faraj 
and Sproull 2000, MacCormack and Forbath 2008). While such structures bring the potential for lower 
costs and/or increased product differentiation, they also present several challenges in effectively 
integrating partners’ efforts across sets of interdependent tasks that are executed concurrently.   
A major challenge confronting a firm and its partners in an R&D project relates to their ability to 
share critical project information in a timely and efficient manner (Cummings 2004). Rarely can all 
the necessary information to complete an R&D project be specified in advance, or all dependencies 
between partners removed via clear and stable interfaces (MacCormack et al. 2001, Mishra and Sinha 
2010). Toward this end, there is a clear need to develop mechanisms that facilitate inter-organizational 
communication. Many prior studies have found that project performance is correlated with the 
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frequency of face-to-face meetings (e.g., Kirkman et al. 2004; Hinds and Mortensen 2005, Cummings 
and Kiesler 2005). In contexts where face-to-face interaction is impractical or costly, performance has 
been shown to be higher to the extent that project teams employ “real-time” and “high bandwidth” 
technologies, which capture rich and timely information on content and context, as well as non-verbal 
cues, such as body language (Malhotra et al. 2000). 
Another critical challenge that impacts both the efficiency and the effectiveness with which 
information is shared between a firm and its partners in an R&D project relates to the staffing policy 
adopted by partners. In some cases, resources are scheduled on an “as needed” basis, parachuting into 
a project only for specific tasks; in others, they are allocated to multiple projects simultaneously, 
allowing them to switch from one to another during downtime (MacCormack and Forbath 2007). Yet 
such policies generate major challenges associated with creating shared goals, building trust and 
understanding important contextual information about a project’s objectives and methods, much of 
which is tacit in nature (Jarvenpaa and Leidner 1999, Kayworth and Leidner 2000, Narayanan et al. 
2009). Indeed, many studies in the context of distributed project teams have shown that the 
unpredictable communication patterns resulting from uneven staffing create major problems for such 
teams (Johansson et al. 1999, Crampton 2001, Huckman et al, 2009). 
An additional distinctive challenge for R&D projects that comprise multiple organizations is the 
management of intellectual property (IP). The activity of R&D is founded upon the need to create new 
and unique product positions that can be protected from imitation while generating a stream of future 
profits (Teece 1986). Yet recent work argues that a more open approach to managing IP can produce 
greater returns (Chesbrough 2003, Lerner and Tirole 2002, West 2003, von Hippel 2005). In 
collaborative projects, the sharing of firms’ existing IP may help partners to complete tasks with lower 
costs and higher product quality than otherwise (MacCormack et al. 2007). The sharing of IP 
associated with a project’s outputs can also help align incentives across partners and thereby resolve 
contracting problems associated with incomplete information (Williamson 1985). While such 
strategies carry a risk of opportunism, especially in regimes of weak appropriability, the value created 
through greater sharing of IP often exceeds such risks (Hagedoorn et al. 2005, Bessen 2006). 
The studies cited above, along with many others in this field, suggest a common theme: the 
challenges inherent in partnered R&D projects can be mitigated to some extent by managing partners 
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the same way one would manage an internal team of resources. Instead of a transactional relationship, 
where partners are kept at arm’s-length, the aim is greater integration, thereby creating incentives and 
mechanisms to facilitate the sharing of information between teams (Clark and Fujimoto 1991, Iansiti 
1997, MacCormack and Forbath 2007). Yet few studies explicitly address the trade-offs associated 
with such an approach. Specifically, given that firms have a variety of different strategies with regard 
to their partnering relationships, under what circumstances are the potential costs of greater integration 
outweighed by the benefits that result? Addressing this question requires analyzing the interplay 
between project governance on one hand, and project management on the other, providing the second 
major focus for this study. 
 
Hypothesis Development 
 Firms partner for multiple reasons; while some seek to exploit existing capabilities or gain 
cost/capacity advantages, others seek to explore new technologies and learn about new markets (Koza 
and Lewin 1998). Furthermore, the scope of partnering relationships differs significantly, from a pure 
focus on R&D to a broader relationship that may encompass production and delivery services (Khanna 
et al. 1998). Contracts represent a key mechanism for coordinating transactions between a firm and its 
partners (Vanneste and Puranam 2010, Gulati et al. 2005), and for minimizing risks in such 
transactions (Grossman and Hart 1986, Eisenhardt 1989). Understanding how different choices of 
partnering strategy – defined here as comprising both the objective and scope for a partnering 
relationship – relate to the optimal choice of contract is of critical importance (Bannerjee and Duflo 
2000). Furthermore, understanding how these contractual choices, in turn, impact the costs and 
benefits of different approaches to project management is essential to capture maximum value from 
these relationships. Below, we develop hypotheses about the nature of these linkages and their 
association with performance. 
 
Impact of Partnering Objective on Contract Choice 
 We conceptualize partnering objective of an R&D project on a continuum ranging from a short-
run partnering objective to long-run partnering objective. Firms with a long-run partnering objective 
involve partners in their R&D projects to gain access to their unique skills and technical capabilities 
and to explore new market knowledge. The returns from such an objective are likely to be distant in 
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time and uncertain compared to a short-run partnering objective wherein firms focuses on involving 
partners for minimizing development costs and supplementing development capacity. As partnering 
objective in a project become increasingly long-run, the task of determining the project’s requirements 
as well as the total cost of executing a project becomes increasingly challenging (Kalnins and Mayer 
2004). Since firms with long-run partnering objective are less likely to have a complete understanding 
of the final output or the expected deliverables at the beginning of a project, the execution of such a 
project requires considerable trial and error learning and experimentation from partners. As project 
execution progresses through trial and error learning and experimentation, new information about 
project tasks may be uncovered that necessitate changes in the project requirements and the expected 
deliverables from the project (Terwiesch et al. 2002). Under such circumstances, both the firm and its 
partners are more likely to prefer a contract that allows for greater flexibility in project execution, such 
as a time & materials or a performance-based contract relative to a fixed price contract. 
 From a partner’s perspective, a time & materials or a performance-based contract shifts the 
considerable financial and project management risks of experimentation to the firm (Bannerjee and 
Duflo 2000, Gopal et al. 2003). Further, given that fixed price contracts are typically associated with 
higher contractual cost of penalties relative to a time & materials or performance-based contract 
(Gefen et al. 2008), partners are less likely to prefer the former type of contract when uncertainty 
relating to partnering objectives is high. From the firm’s perspective, a time & materials or a 
performance-based contract gives it the necessary flexibility to incorporate changes and re-specify the 
project requirements as the project execution progresses. Additionally, given that uncertainty relating 
to the deliverables from the project is often unknown at the beginning of a project with long-run 
partnering objective, the risk of opportunistic behavior from the partners is high (Kalnins and Mayer 
2004). For example, partners may shirk and not provide the expected level of effort toward 
implementation and after sales service (Mooi and Ghosh 2010). A time & materials or a performance-
based contract for such a project is likely to control the risk of opportunistic behavior by the partners 
(relative to a fixed price contract) as they are fully compensated for the changes under such a 
contractual regime, regardless of extent and scope of those changes. Based on the above arguments, 
we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: As partnering objective becomes increasingly long-run, the choice of time & 
materials or performance-based contract supplants that of fixed price contract.  
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Impact of Partnering Scope on Contract Choice 
 A key decision relating to the organization of an R&D project involves determining the functional 
or ‘vertical’ scope of partner involvement in a project (Gerwin and Ferris 2004, Oxley and Sampson 
2004). Establishing the scope of partner involvement, hereby referred to as partnering scope, in a 
project involves decisions such as whether to restrict partner involvement to key strategic stages of a 
project, such as the design or testing stages, or to extend it to involve also the production or service 
delivery phase. 
 As the extent of partnering scope in a project increases, the overall complexity of partnering 
relationships in a project increases (Zollo et al. 2002). With greater partnering scope, the partners are 
accountable for multiple project tasks across the initial design stages as well as the execution stages of 
a project. Since new interdependencies between tasks that were previously unknown at the beginning 
of a project are often likely to be uncovered during the downstream stages of a project, initial project 
requirements may often change and potential for rework will be high (Sosa et al. 2004, Terwiesch et 
al. 2002). As a consequence, with the partners involved in various project tasks that span multiple 
stages of a project, a non-trivial amount of their efforts would be spent in carrying rework of upstream 
project tasks. 
 From a firm’s standpoint, with greater partnering scope, the transaction costs encountered in 
negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing explicit detailed contracts is likely to be high (Gerwin and 
Ferris 2004). While a fixed price contract would provide the firm with greater managerial control over 
the project and reduce transaction costs, creating detailed and verified specifications for a fixed price 
contract poses a significant challenge to the firm. Because of bounded rationality, it is difficult to 
foresee or predict all potential contingencies and rework activity relating to partner involvement in a 
project (Gefen et al. 2008). As Williamson (1985) suggests, under such circumstances the best 
possible alternative for the firm is to prepare a contract that contains a general set of guidelines for 
handling unforeseen contingencies. Both time &materials as well as performance-based contracts 
provide a suitable framework for incorporating such general guidelines. As long as the partners 
resolve contingencies and accomplish rework in a project, as per the guidelines, they are likely to be 
compensated for their effort. Based on the above arguments, we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: As partnering scope increases, the choice of time & materials or performance-
based contract supplants that of fixed price contract. 
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Impact of Partner Integration on Partnering Performance across Contract Choices 
  Prior studies on how partnered projects should be managed have shown the potential benefits 
associated with a greater degree of integration between a partner firm’s staff and an in-house 
development team (Jarvenpaa and Leidner 1999, Kayworth and Leidner 2000, Chesbrough 2003, 
Kirkman et al. 2004). These relationships have been demonstrated for a variety of practices, including 
more frequent and richer communication, lower levels of partner staff turnover and higher levels of IP 
sharing. However, none of these studies consider the potential trade-offs from such approaches, nor 
their interaction with different types of governance structure. These are important omissions given, a) 
a higher level of partner integration is more costly for both a firm and its partners, and b) the choice of 
contract for a project, properly aligned to the partnering strategy of a firm, creates an incentive 
structure within which decisions are made about how to respond to new or changing requirements. We 
therefore seek to explore the impact of different management choices on both project costs and 
product quality; and to examine these dynamics under different contract choices to understand 
differences between them. 
Consider first the situation where a firm is using partners to lower the cost of clearly defined and 
specified R&D tasks (e.g., routine testing of a software component). As we argue above, such a 
partnering strategy is best suited to a fixed price contract. Under such a contract, there are no 
incentives for the partners to devote extra efforts to increasing the product’s overall level of quality as 
the partner is less likely to be rewarded for this effort in such a project. Additionally, given that the 
task specifications are clearly identified, partners typically have limited opportunities to influence the 
final level of product quality. All else being equal, managing such a project with a high level of 
partner integration will therefore incur added costs, for both the partners (e.g., added staffing costs) as 
well as the firm (e.g., added communication costs) relative to projects in which a lower level of 
integration is used. Furthermore, these added costs will come without a consequent increase in the 
overall level of product quality.3 
                                                
3 The extra costs incurred by partners due to higher levels of integration will likely be reflected in the fixed price 
set in the contract. The extra costs incurred by the firm however are separate costs that must also be captured to 
truly evaluate the impact of different practices across projects.  It is therefore important to define the costs 
associated with different approaches more broadly than just the monetary exchange that takes place between the 
firm and its partners.    
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Given that contracts serve as governance structures for firms to regulate partnering relationships 
(Gulati et al. 2005), an increase in the level of partner integration in a project is likely to increase the 
scale and the scope of the contract for the project. Writing such contracts is not only cognitively 
burdensome, but also a costly exercise as the firm has to put more effort into documenting the roles 
and responsibilities of the partners and include additional contractual clauses (Vanneste and Puranam 
2010). Hence, we expect project costs to increase with the level of partner integration. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3: Under a fixed price contract, an increase in partner integration will be 
associated with higher cost, but not higher product quality. 
 
Consider next the situation where a firm is using the partner firm to provide important new 
technical capabilities on a project (e.g., designing the composite fuselage for an aircraft). As we argue 
above, such a strategy is best suited to a time & materials or performance-based contract, given the 
greater flexibility that they provide. Under these circumstances, the partner has both the incentive and 
the ability to influence the final level of product quality. Projects managed with a higher level of 
partner integration will therefore be associated with higher project costs, but will also be associated 
with higher product quality.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 4: Under time & materials and performance-based contracts, an increase in 
partner integration will be associated with higher cost and higher product quality. 
 
Our final pair of hypotheses focuses on the differences in the effect of partner integration across 
different types of contract. Specifically, while we argue above that the overall cost of partnering will 
be higher in projects that use higher levels of partner integration, this relationship is likely to be more 
pronounced in time & materials and performance-based contracts. Fixed price contracts place a cap on 
the revenues that a partner can earn hence the partner will strive to minimize project costs and increase 
efficiency (Arora and Asundi 1999, Kalnins and Mayer 2004, Gopal and Sivaramakrishnan 2008). In 
contrast, under a time & materials or performance-based contract, partners have incentives to seek out 
additional work not specified in the initial contract, which would improve product quality, and hence 
increase billable hours, and/or raise the expected return from performance-based bonuses (Gopal and 
Sivaramakrishnan 2008).  Furthermore, these actions are typically aligned with the strategic objectives 
that firms have for their partnering relationships when adopting such contracts. Hence we argue: 
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HYPOTHESIS 5: As partner integration increases, both time & materials and performance-
based contracts will be associated with higher cost as compared to a fixed price contract. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 6: As partner integration increases, both time & materials and performance-
based contracts will be associated with higher product quality as compared to a fixed price 
contract. 
 
The conceptual model that results from the above hypotheses is shown in Figure 1.  In the next 









The analysis presented in this study is based on fieldwork, followed subsequently by the collection 
of primary data through a survey of R&D projects. Prior to the launch of the survey, we conducted 
interviews with managers in R&D projects across multiple firms in different industries to understand 
the differences in partnering strategies employed in practice, and to identify the critical factors which 
impact the performance of partnered R&D projects (MacCormack and Forbath, 2008). The qualitative 
insights developed through the interviews helped in the development of a web-based survey that 
sought to capture the nuances of partnering relationships in R&D projects through the constructs of 
partnering strategy, contract choice, partner integration, and partnering performance, among others.  
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The unit of analysis for our survey is an R&D project. The sample population was defined to be 
R&D projects that involved at least one remote vendor/partner team of 5 or more people contributing 
to design or engineering work. This definition purposely excluded contract workers from being 
classified as partners. A preliminary paper-based version of the survey instrument was designed and 
pilot-tested first among a set of managers involved in the qualitative interview stage to asses for 
content validity and clarity of the questions. Following, this phase of pilot testing, we engaged an 
established market research firm to design and implement the web-based version of the survey 
instrument. A preliminary web-based version of the survey was pilot tested by the market research 
firm among a small sample of respondents across six different industries—namely, software, 
hardware, telecommunications, financial services, automotive, and medical devices. Respondents were 
screened to ensure they had detailed knowledge of the project and occupied key positions of 
responsibility within their firm such as a project manager, a program manager, or a senior manager in 
the R&D or product development function. This round of pilot-testing generated 50 responses, 
allowing us to test the web-based version of the survey in conditions that would be similar to those in 
actual survey implementation. Overall, the two rounds of pilot-testing helped us in gauging the initial 
reactions to the survey, and identify survey questions that were confusing and prone to 
misinterpretation by respondents. Specific aspects of the survey, such as item-non response, survey 
dropouts and the time taken to answer the questionnaire, were assessed and modifications were made 
to the content and the organization of the survey to improve the survey taking experience. 
The final web-based version of the survey was implemented by the market research firm in a 
targeted sampling list (derived from their database) of managers involved in the R&D or product 
development function within their company, across the six different industries identified above. A 
stratified sampling technique was adopted to ensure that sure a defined minimum number of responses 
were obtained from respondents in each industry. Given the greater penetration of partnered R&D 
efforts in software and hardware, we established a higher target for the number of responses in these 
industries. We obtained 205 completed surveys. After removing observations that contained 
incomplete or erroneous data, our final sample comprised of responses from 172 projects. Table A1 in 
the appendix reports the survey questionnaire items that were used in this study. 
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Sample Characteristics 
 In terms of the respondent profile, approximately 63% of the respondents were project managers 
or program managers while the remaining 37% were senior managers who currently managed the 
R&D, engineering, or product development department within their firm. All the respondents 
indicated that they have had past experience of managing or supervising a project where external 
partners performed substantive design or engineering work in the project. The respondent profile 
suggests that the respondents were likely to be knowledgeable not only about their project but also 
about the broader domain of project management, thereby increasing our confidence in the quality and 
the accuracy of the data (Li et al. 2007). 
 With respect to the demographic characteristics of the projects, the median project team size was 
52 members with projects reporting a median duration of 9.5 months and a median budget of $3 
million dollars. Additionally, the median percentage of a project’s budget that was allocated to the 
work performed by partners was 32.5% and the median number of partners involved in a project was 
2.5. The sample of projects fell into three broad product categories: Electronic Hardware (e.g., 
Computer Server, Telecommunications Equipment) – 36% of the total sample; Software (e.g., 
Enterprise Software, Real Time Systems Software) – 44% of the total sample; and Other Physical 
Product (e.g., Medical Device, Automobile) – 20% of the total sample. 
                             
Dependent Variables:  
 Partnering Performance: We assessed the impact of partner involvement in a project across three 
key dimensions: project completion time, project costs, and product quality (i.e., quality in terms of 
potential revenue generated by the project). The use of multiple performance dimensions to measure 
partnering performance reflects the notion that R&D projects have multiplicity of performance 
objectives that need to be taken into account to obtain a holistic assessment of partner contribution to 
the project (Bercovitz et al. 2006, Hoegl et al. 2004, Faraj and Sproull 2000). Specifically, respondents 
rated the impact of involving partners in their projects across each dimension by specifying the % 
increase (or decrease) in values across each dimension. That is, increases in project completion time, 
project costs, and product quality were denoted by positive % values and vice-versa. Given that the 
measures of project completion time and project costs both reflected a project’s ability to efficiently 
utilize input resources and were highly correlated with each other, we combined these two measures 
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using principal component analysis to create a single measure: cost. The empirical analysis in this 
study, therefore, utilizes two dependent variables to measure the impact of partnering relationships in a 
project: Cost and Quality. Given that a respondent’s perception of partnering performance in a project 
may be influenced by the overall performance of the project, we carried out analysis to assess the 
impact of overall project performance and confirm the robustness of partnering performance measures. 
The details of this analysis are provided in the section on checks for robustness on p. 28. 
 
 Contract Choice: Contract choice is a categorical variable in our study that reflects the governance 
structure for the project. We examine three different choices of contract in our study: fixed price 
contract, time & materials contract, and performance-based contract. 
 
Independent Variables: 
 Partnering Objective: To evaluate the partnering objective of a project, we first asked respondents to 
provide a relative ranking of the importance of four dimensions in their project.  Specifically, respondents 
were asked to rank the importance of the following dimensions on a 1-4 scale (1-most important, 4- least 
important): (i) to lower the cost of labor and resources, (ii) to supplement development capacity, (iii) to 
access technical expertise or other skills not possessed in-house, and (iv) to access knowledge about the 
local market and/or relationships with local organizations. The first two dimensions relating to lowering 
cost and enhancing development efficiency reflected short-run objectives for a project, whereas the 
remaining two objectives relating to accessing superior technical knowledge and market knowledge 
reflected long-run objectives for a project. Given that the different dimensions were ranked relative to 
each other, greater importance to the first two dimensions (e.g., a rank of 1 or 2) was indicative of lower 
importance to the last two dimensions (e.g., a rank of 3 or 4). We, therefore, developed a continuous 
measure of partnering objective for a project by averaging the rankings across the first two dimensions; 
this measure had numerical values ranging on a scale from 1.5 to 3.5, with increasing values on the scale 
representing an increase in the long-run orientation for a project.  
 
 Partnering Scope: To assess the extent of partnering scope in an R&D project, we asked respondents 
to indicate whether partners were involved in (i) Development only (coded as ‘0’) or (ii) Development 
and Production (coded as ‘1’). Higher values, thus, indicated greater partnering scope in a project. 
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 Partner Integration: As indicated earlier, partner integration captures the extent to which partner 
staff worked closely with the internal project team and were involved in the project. To measure 
partner integration in a project, respondents were asked to rate the extent to which partner staff were 
involved in the project across three dimensions:(1) the extent to which partner staff were allocated to 
the project [full-time = 1, part-time = 0], (2) the extent to which partner staff were included in internal 
project team communications [included in all internal project team communication = 1, included only 
in relevant internal project team communications or not included at all = 0] , and (3) given access to 
intellectual property [full and open access to intellectual property  = 1, selective or no access to 
intellectual property = 0]. The responses across each of these three dimensions were summarized to 
yield a composite measure of partner integration with values ranging from 0 to 3. 
 
Control Variables 
 Project Characteristics: External factors pertaining to the characteristics of a project could create 
potential variation in partnering performance outcomes. Hence, we controlled for several such project 
characteristics in our analysis. 
• Project Team Size: Project team size captures the total number of employees belonging to a firm 
and its partners that were directly involved in the execution of the project. We included the natural 
logarithm of this variable, ln[Team Size] ,in our analysis.  
 
• Project Duration: Project duration measures the total duration of a project in months and is an 
indicator of the time input as well as the manpower or labor input in the project.  We included 
the natural logarithm of this variable, ln[Duration], in our analysis.  
 
• Project Budget:  Project budget represents the total budgetary allocation for a project. We asked 
respondents to indicate the actual cost of the project (in millions of US dollars). We included 
the natural logarithm of this variable, ln[Budget],in our analysis  
 
• Project Type: Following past studies (e.g., Atuahene-Gima 2003, Vanneste and Puranam, 2010), 
we controlled for the effect of project type on partnering performance by creating two dummy 
variables (Software and Electronic Hardware) and including them in our analysis.  
 
• Partnering Budget: Partnering budget represents the percentage of the overall budget of the R&D 
project which was allocated to partnering relationships in the project.  
 
 Respondent Characteristics: To minimize respondent biases (Kirsch et al. 2002), we controlled for 
heterogeneity among respondents by: (i) creating a dummy variable to represent their role in the project 
(Project/Program Manager or Head of R&D/Engineering/Product Development) and (ii) by creating 
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dummy variables to represent their functions within the organization (Management, Product 
Development, Product Management, Program Management, Engineering, Finance, Marketing, Sales, 
Others).  
 
 Firm-level Heterogeneity: Finally, we also controlled for firm level heterogeneity in our analysis 
by including the following control variables to reflect firm level characteristics:  
• Firm Partnering: Firm partnering captures the percentage of development projects in a firm’s 
product development portfolio that makes significant use of partners to perform design and 
development work. We included the natural logarithm of this variable, ln[Firm Partnering], in our 
analysis  
 
• Firm Size: Firm size captures the number of employees in the firm. We included the natural 
logarithm of this variable, ln[Firm Size],in our analysis  
 
• Industry: We control for heterogeneity in industry type in our analysis by including dummy 
variables for the six industries that are represented in  the study sample (Software, Hardware, 
Telecommunications, Financial Services, Automotive, and Medical Devices) 
 
4.  Empirical Results 
Table A2 in the appendix reports the summary statistics and pair-wise correlations for the 
variables in our analysis. A review of the pair-wise correlations indicated that multicollinearity was 
not a significant concern in the analysis. Nonetheless, we calculated the variation inflation factors 
(VIF’s) for all estimated models as a precaution, and these were within acceptable limits. 
The analysis is carried out in two stages. In the first stage, we examine the impact of partnering 
strategy on the choice of contract for a project. In the second stage, we examine how the choice of 
contract then affects the relationship between partner integration and partnering performance. 
 
Contract Choice Model 
The choice of contract for a project in our sample represents a nominal categorical variable with 
three choices—fixed price, time & materials, and performance-based contracts. We therefore specify a 
multinomial probit model with contract choice as the dependent variable and the partnering strategy 
variables, partnering objective and partnering scope, as independent variables, along with the control 
variables described previously: 
Contract Choice = β0 + β1-22 . [Control Variables] 
+ β23 . Partnering Objective + β24 . Partnering Scope     --------- (1) 
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 The results of the multinomial probit model predicting contract choice are presented in Table 1. 
Fixed price contract is denoted the reference category in the analysis. The coefficients of the 
independent variables in the contract choice equations predicting the choice of time & materials 
contract and performance-based contract represent the marginal effect of the independent variables in 
predicting these contract choices vis-à-vis the choice of a fixed price contract. 
 
Table 1: Multinomial Probit Model for Contract Choice  
 
 Fixed Price  Contract 




Constant  -7.143***  -4.976** 
     
Industry:     
Software  2.287**  -0.482 
Hardware  2.282**  -1.738** 
Telecommunications   2.446***  -1.839** 
Financial Services  1.868**  -2.497*** 
Automotive  1.370  -1.762** 
Respondent Functions:     
Management  0.439  1.917*** 
Product Development  0.681  2.190*** 
Product Management  -1.100**  -2.772*** 
Program Management  -0.406  -0.739 
Engineering  -0.117  0.864* 
Finance  -0.659  0.361 
Marketing  0.154  -1.540 
Sales  -0.794  -0.076 
Project/Program Manager  -0.118  1.166*** 
ln[Team Size]  -0.111  0.287 
ln[Budget]  0.176  -0.255* 
ln[Duration]  0.047  -0.759** 
Partnering Budget  0.004  -0.014 
Software  -0.068  0.796 
Electronic Hardware  -0.683  0.303 
ln[Firm Size]  0.159*  -0.167 
ln[Firm Partnering]  0.211  0.448 
Partnering Objective [PO]  0.550***  0.486*** 
Partnering Scope [PS]  0.666**  0.790** 
Log-Likelihood     -134.04 
Chi-Square            109.55 *** 
AIC      368.07 
Sample Size (N)    172 
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Hypothesis 1 predicts that both time & materials contract and performance-based contract will 
supplant the choice of fixed price contract, respectively, with increasing long run orientation of 
partnering objective. Consistent with these predictions, the probit model results indicate significant 
positive effects of partnering objective on the choice of time and materials contract (β = 0.550, p < 
0.01) and performance-based contract (β = 0.486, p < 0.01), indicating support for Hypothesis 1. 
Taken together, these findings highlight an increasing tendency for managers to choose time and 
materials or performance-based contract over a fixed price contract as partnering objective becomes 
increasingly long-run. 
 Hypothesis 2 predicts that both time & materials contract and performance-based contract will 
supplant the choice of fixed price contract, respectively, with increasing partnering scope. . Consistent 
with these predictions, the probit model results indicate significant positive effects of partnering scope 
on the choice of time & materials contract (β = 0.666, p < 0.05) and performance-based contract (β = 
0.790, p < 0.05), indicating support for Hypothesis 2. Taken together, these findings suggest an 
increasing tendency for managers to choose time and materials or performance-based contract over a 
fixed price contract with increasing scope of partnering relationships in a project. 
 
Partnering Performance Model 
The choice of contract represents an endogenous self-selected variable in our conceptual 
framework that is driven by the partnering strategy for a project.  Standard OLS regression, where the 
predictor variables are assumed to be exogenous, can lead to biased estimates when examining the 
interrelationship between contract choices, partner integration, and partnering performance. To correct 
for endogeneity, we use a “treatment-effects” model (Maddala 1983, Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003). 
The treatment effect model involves running separate regressions on each contract choice (or 
“treatment”) to estimate the impact of partner integration on partnering performance. Each individual 
regression also includes a variable called the Inverse Mills Ratio, which corrects for the endogenous 
self-selection of the project into its observed contract choice. The inverse mills ratio variable for each 
contract choice is constructed using the predicted probabilities for that contract choice from the first 
stage multinomial probit choice model shown in equation (1). The inclusion of the inverse mills ratio 
variable can often create significant multicollinearity issues when the set of control variables do not 
differ across the two stages (Hamilton and Nickerson 2003). Therefore, to circumvent this issue, we 
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removed the control variables for industry and respondent function from the analysis.4 The partnering 
performance model for each contract choice is specified as follows: 
Costi  =  γ0i + γ1-9i  . [Control Variables] 
+ γ10i . Partner Integration + γ11i . Inverse Mills Ratio   --------- (2) 
 
Qualityi =  γ0i + γ1-9i . [Control Variables] 
+ γ10i . Partner Integration + γ11i . Inverse Mills Ratio   --------- (3) where i Є {Fixed Price Contract, Time and Materials Contract, Performance‐based Contract} 
 
 We use the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) technique (Zellner 1962) to estimate the effect 
of partner integration on the dependent variables of cost and product quality, for each contract choice. 
SUR is the appropriate technique for estimating the coefficients in regression equations when the 
errors from the equations are correlated with each other. Since the data for the regression equations in 
the partnering performance model are collected from the same set of projects, it is likely that the error 
terms in these equations may be correlated with each other. Hence, we use the SUR technique to 
estimate the regression coefficients in these equations. The effects of contract choice on the 
relationship between partner integration and partnering performance is then detected by comparing the 
coefficients of partner integration in the regression equations representing fixed price contract to those 
in the regression equations representing time & materials and performance-based contract. The results 
representing the effect of partner integration on partnering performance for each category of contract 
choice are represented in Table 2. The appropriateness of the SUR technique in our analysis is 
confirmed by the Breusch-Pagan (χ2) test for independence which indicates significant correlation 









                                                
4 We also carried out the analysis in the second stage by including the control variables for industry and 
respondent function. Despite the presence of multicollinearity among the control variables, the parameter 
estimates of the partner integration variable were consistent with those from our main analysis in the paper. 
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Table 2: SUR results for Partnering Performance Model 
 
 Fixed Price Contract 
 Time & Materials  
Contract 
 Performance-based  
Contract 





Constant -17.840 9.054  -34.543 -40.821  -33.751 -22.481 
Project/Program Manager -1.014 -0.954  -4.121 11.084**  -12.021** -6.461 
ln[Team Size] 1.172 3.526*  -1.436 -1.804  0.671 -1.800 
ln[Budget] 0.623 0.668  4.695*** 3.721**  4.343* 5.455** 
ln[Duration] 0.923   -6.475**  -1.557 4.030  10.006*** 7.659* 
Partnering Budget 0.148 0.122  -0.172 0.081  0.376* 0.037 
Software 1.404 3.740  -0.996 5.286  6.185 -3.213 
Electronic Hardware -7.918 -4.428  -2.764 7.946  7.477 -5.111 
ln[Firm Size] -1.668 -1.838  -0.904 1.990  -8.772*** -9.750*** 
ln[Firm Partnering] 7.026 3.751  12.461** 2.595  13.834* 19.411** 
Partner Integration  6.294*** 1.316  7.623*** 10.778***  14.529*** 13.372*** 
Inverse Mills Ratio (λ) -2.847 0.577  4.178 0.603  1.454 16.708* 
R-Square   0.322 0.254  0.430 0.392  0.688 0.643 
Chi-Square 37.06*** 26.57**  45.22*** 38.61***  74.87*** 61.29*** 
Sample Size (N) 78  60  34 
Breusch-Pagan (χ2)  




     10.863*** 
 
 
*p< 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
 
 Hypothesis 3 predicts that fixed price contracts will be associated with increasing costs but no 
effect on product quality as partner integration increases. The regression results indicate that partner 
integration has a significant positive effect on cost (β = 6.294, p < 0.01) but no effect on product 
quality (β = 1.1316, p > 0.10). Hypothesis 3 is therefore supported in our study. In contrast, 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that both time & materials and performance-based contracts will be associated 
with an increase in costs as well as an increasing in product quality as partner integration increases. As 
the regression model results for time & materials contract indicate, partner integration not only has a 
significant positive effect on cost (β = 7.623, p < 0.01) but also a significant positive impact on 
product quality (β = 10.778, p < 0.01). An examination of the regression results for performance-based 
contract reveals a similar trend—i.e., partner integration has a positive impact on both cost (β = 
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14.529, p < 0.01) and product quality (β = 13.372, p < 0.01) in a project. Hypothesis 4 is, therefore, 
supported in our study. 
Hypothesis 5 predicts that partner integration will be associated with higher costs in the presence 
of time and materials contract and performance-based contract, respectively, compared to a fixed price 
contract. The procedure for testing this hypothesis involves comparing the coefficients of partner 
integration on cost across the different contract choices and conducting a statistical t-test to evaluate 
the differences in coefficients. A comparison of the coefficient of partner integration across fixed price 
and time & materials contract does not indicate any significant differences (β = 1.328, p > 0.1). That 
is, the effect of partner integration on cost does not differ across fixed price and time & materials 
contract choices. In contrast, a comparison of the coefficient of partner integration across fixed price 
and performance-based contract indicates significant differences (β = 8.235, p < 0.01). This indicates 
that partner integration has a stronger positive effect on cost in the case of performance-based contract 
compared to fixed price contract. Hypothesis 5 is therefore partially supported in our analysis. Figure 
2 illustrates effect of partner integration on cost across the different contract choices. 
 
 
Figure 2: Effect of Partner Integration on Cost across the different Contract Choices 
 
Hypothesis 6 predicts that partner integration will be associated with higher product quality in the 
presence of both time & materials contract and performance-based contract as compared to a fixed 
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price contract. A comparison of the coefficients of partner integration on product quality across time & 
materials (β = 9.463, p < 0.01) and performance-based (β = 12.056, p < 0.01) contract to that in fixed 
price contract reveals significant differences. That is, partner integration has a stronger positive effect 
on product quality in the presence of a time & materials and performance-based contract compared to 
a fixed price contract. Hypothesis 6 is therefore supported in our analysis. Figure 3 illustrates effect of 
partner integration on cost across the different contract choices. 
 
 
Figure 3: Effect of Partner Integration on Product Quality across the different Contract Choices 
 
Impact of (Mis)alignment between Partnering Strategy and Contract Choice 
 We carried out additional analysis to examine the performance consequences when partnering 
strategy and contract choice in a project were not aligned, i.e., when observed contract choice for a 
project was not consistent with the theoretically predicted contract choice from the partnering strategy 
of the project. The predicted contract choice for a project was determined by taking into account the 
predicted probability values associated with each contract choice for the project. A comparison 
between the observed and the predicted contract choice for a project highlighted four distinct 
categories of projects: 
 
• Category 1: Observed contract choice = Predicted contract choice = Fixed price contract (n = 55 
projects) 
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• Category 2: Observed contract choice = Fixed price contract, Predicted contract choice = Time & 
materials/Performance-based contract (n = 23 projects) 
 
• Category 3: Observed contract choice = Time & materials/Performance-based contract, Predicted 
contract choice = Fixed price contract (n = 36 projects) 
 
• Category 4: Observed contract choice = Predicted contract choice = Time & 
materials/Performance-based contract (n = 58 projects) 
 
 We then examined the effect of partner integration on cost and product quality across these four 
categories.  Our analysis revealed some intriguing findings which are documented in Figure 4.  
 
Predicted Contract Choice 
 
Fixed Price T&M/Performance -based 
 
Category 3: 36 projects 
(Misalignment) 
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                                 *Coefficients represent the effect of Partner Integration  
                                 (standard errors in parentheses) 
 
Figure 4: Effect of (mis)alignment between partnering strategy (i.e., predicted contract choice) and 
observed contract choice on partnering performance 
 
 Specifically, a comparison of the results across samples of projects in categories 1 and 3 indicated 
that partner integration had a higher impact on cost when managers chose a time & materials or a 
performance-based contract (β = 11.586, p < 0.01) for a project instead of the predicted choice of fixed 
price contract (β = 5.882, p < 0.01) for the project. The difference in the effect of partner integration 
on cost across these two categories was statistically significant (β = 5.704, p < 0.05). However, despite 
the incremental impact on cost, an unintended benefit that arose out of increasing levels of partner 
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integration in the sample of projects in category 3 was the accompanying improvement in product 
quality (β = 6.600, p < 0.01).  
 In contrast, a comparison of the results across samples of projects in categories 2 and 4 indicated 
that while partner integration had statistically similar impact on cost across these categories (β = 
8.481, p < 0.01 in Category 2; β = 8.752, p < 0.01 in Category 4), it had no impact on product quality 
(β = 1.861, p > 0.1) when managers chose a fixed price contract for a project instead of the predicted 
choice of time & materials or performance-based contract. Taken together, the findings across the sub-
samples indicate that the penalty for choosing a contract that is not aligned with the partnering strategy 
for a project is asymmetric across contract choices. The performance consequences of such a 
misalignment is particularly severe in projects where a fixed price contract is chosen instead of the 
predicted choice of time & materials or a performance-based contract—not only does the 
misalignment render partner integration ineffective in improving product quality but also make it 
‘counter-productive’ when it came to managing the costs of the project. 
 
Checks for Robustness  
  Assessing the Impact of Overall Project Performance on Partnering Performance: The overall 
performance of a project may influence a respondent’s perception of partner contribution to the project 
and bias evaluations of partnering performance. We carried out analysis to assess whether the 
inclusion of measures for overall project performance in the partnering performance model has any 
impact on the relationship between partner integration and partnering performance, across the different 
contract choices. Specifically, we included two variables that measure the overall performance of a 
project in terms of  % overrun in the project’s budget (Budget Overrun) and the project’s duration 
(Duration Overrun), in the partnering performance model. The analysis using this additional set of 
control variables yielded results that were consistent with the main analysis in Table 2.  
 
 Assessing the Impact of Common Method Variance: Our study uses self-reported data collected 
from a single respondent for each project in our sample. This raises concerns that common method 
variance (CMV)—the amount of spurious covariance shared among variables that can lead to inflated 
correlations among the variables—could bias our findings. We used several procedural techniques, as 
suggested by Podsakoff et al. (2003), to reduce biases arising from CMV. Specifically, we focused on 
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reducing CMV during the survey design stage by: (i) maintaining anonymity of respondents and 
assuring them of confidentiality, which increased their willingness to participate and provide accurate 
responses; (ii) ironing out vague concepts and ambiguities in survey questions through pilot testing 
with actual managers; (iii) using separate response formats for measuring each of the variables in our 
conceptual framework. Additionally, for the following reasons identified below, we believe that CMV 
is less likely to bias our results. 
 First, given the non-linear nature of the majority of our hypothesized relationships—Hypotheses 1 
and 2 are tested using a multinomial probit model whereas Hypothesis 5 and 6 involve interaction 
effects—respondents are less likely to make systematic attributions between the independent and 
dependent variables (Cook and Campbell 1979, Siemsen et al. 2009). Second, key informants within 
the project were approached to respond to our survey. As our respondent profile indicates, nearly 63% 
of the respondents were project managers or program managers while the remaining 37% were senior 
level managers who currently managed the R&D, engineering, product development department 
within their firm. These managers were actively involved in the project, interacted frequently with the 
partner staff and had credible and deep knowledge about the responses.  The practice of using a key 
informant within a firm to examine the dynamics of partnering relationships at the project level is 
consistent with the approach used in recent empirical studies (e.g., Tiwana 2008, Bercovitz et al. 2006, 
Li et al. 2007, Goo et al. 2009). Finally, the objective measures of partnering performance (i.e., cost 
and quality) used in our study are likely to correspond closely to the actual metrics used by managers 
to evaluate the contribution of partners to project performance. This is in marked contrast to subjective 
measures of partnering performance captured on Likert scales that have been frequently used in the 
recent literature to capture partnering performance (Bercovitz et al. 2006, Gulati et al. 2005). While 
subjective measures of partnering performance are likely to tap into a manager’s perceptions of 
partnering performance and could potentially incorporate some of their biases, objective measures 
(such as those used in this study) are less likely to incorporate such biases as they are often directly 
estimated from recorded observations in a project. Collectively, the above arguments suggest that 
CMV does not pose a major threat to our study and is less likely to bias our results. 
 
 Alternative specification for the Partner Integration Variable: As mentioned previously, each of 
the three components of partner integration—namely, (1) the extent to which partner staff were 
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allocated to the project, (2) the extent to which partner staff were included in internal project team 
communications, and (3) the extent to which partner staff were given access to intellectual property—
were coded on a binary scale (0, 1) and summarized to yield a composite score of partner integration 
with values ranging from 0 to 3. We tried an alternative specification for partner integration for testing 
Hypotheses 3-6 wherein each of its underlying dimensions were coded on an ordinal scale from 1 to 3. 
For example, partner staff allocation in a project was coded as 1 if partner staff worked part-time on 
this project during the periods their skills were needed, 2 if partner staff worked full time during the 
period their skills were needed, and 3 if partner staff worked full-time on this project for the entire 
project duration. Consequently, the composite score for partner integration now contained values 
ranging from 3 to 9. The analysis using this alternative specification of partner integration variable 
yielded results that were consistent with the main analysis in Table 3.  
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Our results, in general, confirm the hypotheses that we develop earlier in this paper.  Specifically, 
we show that the choice of contract for an R&D project is associated with the partnering objective and 
the scope of partnering relationship for the project. As discussed earlier, these two factors, in 
combination, constitute a firm’s partnering strategy for a project. Firms that deploy partners in their 
R&D projects to achieve the long-run objectives of accessing unique skills and technical capabilities 
of the partners and gain new market knowledge (relative to the short-run objectives of minimizing 
development costs and gain production/capacity advantages) are likely to choose a time & materials or 
a performance-based contract (relative to a fixed price contract) for the projects. Additionally, firms 
that involve partners over a broader scope of activities in their R&D projects are more likely to choose 
a time & materials or performance-based contract over a fixed price contract for the projects.  The 
choice between a time & materials and a performance-based contract, in turn, relates more to specific 
industry and respondent characteristics, than to project-level variables. In essence, all else being equal, 
firms that that employ broad, capability-based partnering relationships in their R&D projects are 
equally likely to choose either type of contract. 
We also find that an increased level of partner integration is always associated with increased 
costs; but is only associated with increased product quality in projects that use time & materials or 
performance-based contracts. In essence, the choice of contract establishes an incentive regime within 
Page 31  
 
which partners make decisions about the level of effort to expend. This contract also reflects the 
specific objectives that a firm has for the partners. In a fixed price contract, partners are typically 
asked to deliver a product of equivalent quality at lower cost.  The partners have neither the incentive, 
nor the responsibility, to improve product quality. By contrast, under more flexible contracts such as a 
time & materials or performance-based contracts, partners are often asked to contribute unique skills 
and capabilities to the project. The partners not only have the incentive then, but also the responsibility 
to improve product quality. While higher levels of integration can help partners to identify 
improvements in product quality, our results emphasize that such improvements are more likely to be 
seen under flexible contracts. 
Finally, we show that when firms choose the wrong type of contract, thereby creating a 
misalignment between their partnering strategy and their governance structure, they incur a penalty in 
terms of both cost and product quality. The penalty for misalignment, however, is asymmetric, 
depending upon the type of misalignment. Specifically, choosing a fixed price contract in a project 
best suited to a more flexible contract type such as a time & materials or a performance-based contract 
eliminates any association between partner integration and product quality. Conversely, choosing a 
more flexible contract type in a project best suited to a fixed price contract substantially increases the 
cost of integration. However, we also see a gain in product quality. This suggests that in projects with 
short-run partnering objective and narrow scope of partnering relationship, partners are still likely to 
be able to identify opportunities to improve the final product, despite that not being their primary 
objective. 
Findings from this study have distinct implications for practitioners.  In particular, we highlight 
the importance of aligning the governance and management decisions that are made within a project 
with the firm’s overall partnering strategy.  In many firms, there is temporal and structural separation 
between these decisions which increases the likelihood of their misalignment. Specifically, while 
decisions relating to partnering strategy are typically framed by top management at the higher 
echelons of a firm, before the start of a project, decisions relating to the governance and management 
of projects are often made by project managers at the lower echelons of the firm, during the course of 
project execution (Gerwin and Ferris 2004, Ethiraj et al. 2005). As R&D projects often evolve during 
the course of their execution, the partnering strategy formed before the start of a project may not 
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necessarily be compatible with the subsequent governance and management decisions and lead to 
dysfunctional perturbations in project execution (Hoegl et al. 2004). Furthermore, some firms develop 
“umbrella” contract structures for use across many projects or partners, believing this to be more 
efficient way to control governance. Unfortunately, unless these structures encompass a broad 
spectrum of contract choices, they are unlikely to suit every type of project.  Managers must be 
educated consumers of such “standard” contracts, and learn to recognize situations in which 
exceptions are needed. 
The second important finding we highlight is that increasing the level of partner integration is not 
a uniform best practice in project management.  Rather, we show that integration is costly, and these 
costs are only warranted in projects that are governed by flexible contract types such as time & 
materials or performance-based contracts, where partners have both the responsibility and the 
incentive to improve product quality.  Intriguingly, this result runs counter to much conventional 
management wisdom, which focuses only on the upside of partner integration, hence argues that 
“more” is always better.  By carefully articulating the types of context in which integration can lead to 
enhanced quality of the developed product, we help managers (across firms and their partners) assess 
where and when they should pay for these benefits. 
Finally, our results serve to highlight the factors that dictate which of the more flexible contract 
types a manager might wish to choose, in different situations.  We find increased levels of integration 
are more costly under a performance-based contract than a time & materials-based contract.  However, 
the impact on product quality is also higher.  Choosing between these types requires that we assess the 
trade-off between the marginal costs and benefits for specific contexts of interest.  In general, our 
results indicate that in markets where the returns to product quality are high (i.e., the value of a 10% 
increase in sales) the choice of a performance-based contract is optimal – given this will create 
incentives for the partner to maximize product quality.  By contrast, in markets where development 
costs are high and margins are low, we might expect to observe the reverse.  Of course, these results 
must be set against the strong impact of industry-specific factors. 
 From an academic standpoint, our study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, 
our study introduces the notion of “fit” (Venkatraman 1989) to this literature, by articulating the need 
for alignment between a firm’s partnering strategy, and the manner in which it both governs and 
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manages its partnering relationships in R&D projects. While the extant literature on contracts has 
primarily examined the role of contextual attributes (requirements, uncertainty, project complexity, 
project size, etc.) on the choice of contract for a project (Gopal et al. 2003), much less is known about 
how attributes of the partnering relationship influence the choice of contract for a project. Our study 
addresses this gap in the extant literature, by examining how factors characterizing the partnering 
strategy for a project, i.e., partnering objective and partnering scope, shape the choice of contract for 
the project. Further, our study demonstrates the significance of such an alignment between partnering 
strategy and contract choice by providing direct empirical evidence of the performance consequences 
of (mis)alignment. This constitutes an important contribution to the extant literature as it not only 
validates the logic underlying the TCE theory, but also highlights the performance implications of the 
theory—a relationship for which limited empirical evidence exists in the literature (notable 
exceptions include Mayer and Nickerson 2005, Bercovitz et al. 2006, Mooi and Ghosh 2010). As 
Mooi and Ghosh (2010, p. 105) emphasize, “direct evidence of the costs of misaligned governance is a 
crucial test of the logic underlying TCE (Anderson 1988) because lack of such evidence provokes the 
question: Does governance matter? Substantively, understanding the costs of misaligned governance 
is critical to managerial practice because the design of appropriate governance structures ties up 
costly managerial effort and valuable organizational resources.” 
Second, with respect to governance structure in a project, we extend the analysis of traditional 
contract choices (i.e., fixed price and time & materials) in the extant literature by exploring a newer, 
much less studied form of contract (i.e., performance-based contract) in which a partner’s reward is 
contingent on performance.  Finally, in contrast to much of the prior contracting literature which has 
primarily examined contracts in samples of projects drawn from a single firm (Gopal et al. 2003, 
Mayer and Nickerson 2005), our study was designed to capture data from multiple firms across 
multiple industries. This enhances the generalizability of the results from our study. As Mayer and 
Nickerson (2005, p. 239) aptly note, “testing hypotheses at the level of the transaction (i.e., the project 
level) requires detailed data, which makes data collection from multiple firms very costly. [However] 
Only by replicating research of this type in a variety of settings can scholars gain confidence that the 
empirical results apply more broadly.”Also, given that we adopt explicit controls for different firm 
and industry contexts as well as product-specific attributes (i.e., software, hardware and physical 
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products) in our empirical analysis, our results are likely to be quite robust to heterogeneity across 
projects. 
While we have made significant efforts to eliminate or reduce the impact of key challenges that 
impact our research design, this work is still subject to several limitations. We capture data from a 
single respondent; hence our results may reflect the biases that accompany these respondents (we 
discussed these challenges and our responses earlier). We ask these respondents to estimate the impact 
of partners on project performance. While we demonstrate that these assessments are independent of 
overall project level performance, the perceptions of respondents may still have inaccuracies or biases.  
Finally, our data collection effort was based on a targeted sampling list managed by a market research 
firm. It is possible that the populations of participants contacted by this firm may not be wholly 
representative of the general populations in each industry. 
 Our work opens up a number of important avenues for future work.   With respect to contract 
choice, more work is needed to tease apart the costs and benefits of flexible contract types, especially 
with respect to different types of performance-based contracts.  The world of practice has seen a rise in 
the popularity of these contracts, yet without a consequent increase in our understanding of their 
advantages and pitfalls. For example, partners assume increased risk in such contracts, but may lack 
enough market knowledge to understand these risks, or know how to effectively price them.  Further, 
while our results demonstrate the asymmetric penalties associated with misalignment between a firm’s 
partnering strategy and the choice of contract for a project, we still have limited understanding of why 
such asymmetric penalties exist. Future research is needed to better understand the theoretical 
underpinnings for the asymmetric penalties and highlight both the downside risk as well upside 
benefits of such penalties for managers in R&D projects. Finally, we also see potential in broadening 
the scope of our enquiry to include other managerial processes that might be contingent on the choice 
of strategy and/or contract. For example, the choice of development approach (i.e., waterfall or agile 
project management), and the interaction of such a choice with the design of a product’s architecture 
have proven fruitful areas to probe in prior work.  By considering how these decisions can be aligned 
with attributes of a partnering relationship and contract choice, we should significantly improve our 
understanding of how to design an effective partnering relationship.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Questionnaire Items 
 
Please assess the impact of using partners on the following performance outcomes 
Schedule Overrun: Using partners increased total project completion time by ___ % 
Cost Overrun: Using partners increased total project completion costs by ___ % 
Partnering 
Performance 
Quality: Using partners increased product quality by ___ % 
Which of the following best captures the type of contract for the project:  Contract 
Choice 1) Fixed Price Contract, 2) Time & Materials Contract, and 3) Performance-based contract 
Please rank the objectives of your partnering efforts on this project, in order of importance from 1 – 4.  
To lower the cost of labor and resources  
To supplement development capacity  
To access technical expertise or other skills not possessed in-house 
Partnering 
Objective 
To access knowledge about the local market and/or relationships with local organizations  
In general, what was the nature of the relationship with your collaboration partners? 
Development only: Partner only helped to design and test the product 
Partnering 
Scope 
Development and Production: Partner helped to design and test the product and subsequently produced parts for it 
Which of the following best captures the way that partner staff was allocated to the project?  
Partner staff worked full-time on this project, for the entire project duration 
Partner staff worked during the periods their skills were needed 
Partner staff worked part-time on this project, during the periods their skills were needed 
 
Which of the following best captures the degree to which partner staff was included in your internal project 
team communications (e.g., meetings, emails, etc.)? 
Partner staff were included in all internal project team communications  
Partner staff were included in internal project team communications if relevant to their work 
Partner staff were not included in internal project team communications 
 
Which of the following best captures the type of access your partner had to your intellectual property 
during the project? 
The partner had full and open access to any and all intellectual property. 
 The partner had access to selected intellectual property based on permissions and authorizations. 
Partner 
Integration 
The partner had no access to intellectual property. 
Industry: 1) Software (commercial software products), 2) Hardware (computer platforms and systems, storage, 
consumer electronics and computer peripherals), 3) Telecommunications (data, video and voice), 4) Financial 
Services, 5) Automotive, 6) Medical Devices 
Respondent Functional Role: 1) Management, 2) Product Development, 3) Product Management, 4) Program 
Management, 5) Engineering, 6) Finance, 7) Marketing, 8) Sales, and 9) Others 
Respondent Role:  1) Project or Program Manager, and 2) Head of  R&D, Engineering, Product Development 
Team Size: Total number of participants in a project  
Budget: Actual cost of the project  (In Millions)  
Duration: Actual duration of the project (In Months)  
Project Type: 1) Software (e.g., Enterprise Software, Real Time Systems Software), 2) Electonic Hardware (e.g., 
Computer Server, Telecommunications Equipment), and 3) Other Physical Product  (e.g., Medical Device, 
Automobile) 
Partnering Budget:  Percentage of the overall budget for this project  allocated to work performed by partners 
Firm Size: Number of  employees in the organization worldwide 
Control 
Variables 
Firm Partnering: Percentage of the organization's development projects that makes significant use of partners to 
perform design and development work 
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Table A2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 Key Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1 Respondent Role 0.372 0.485 1.000                 
2 ln [TeamSize] 3.894 1.118 -0.058 1.000                
3 ln [Budget] 1.351 1.449 0.025 0.361 1.000               
4 ln [Duration] 2.232 0.730 -0.073 0.118 0.087 1.000              
5 Software 0.430 0.497 -0.135 -0.034 0.023 -0.032 1.000             
6 Electronic Hardware 0.355 0.480 0.184 0.145 0.103 -0.111 -0.644 1.000            
7 Partnering Budget 36.698 21.096 0.060 0.059 0.131 -0.163 -0.101 0.123 1.000           
8 ln [Firm Size] 7.568 1.821 0.060 0.054 0.119 0.179 -0.124 0.049 0.065 1.000          
9 ln [Firm Partnering] 3.785 0.467 -0.015 0.142 0.096 -0.194 -0.030 0.085 0.517 -0.018 1.000         
10 Partnering Objective 4.529 1.105 0.089 0.066 -0.091 0.055 0.030 -0.047 0.018 -0.027 0.052 1.000        
11 Partnering Scope 1.477 0.501 -0.012 0.158 -0.030 -0.168 -0.030 0.047 0.040 0.005 0.111 -0.015 1.000       
12 Fixed Price Contract 0.453 0.499 0.024 -0.126 -0.092 0.059 -0.131 0.106 -0.004 -0.015 -0.074 -0.215 -0.168 1.000      
13 Time & Materials Contract 0.349 0.478 -0.034 0.036 0.070 0.047 0.054 -0.058 0.124 0.125 0.090 0.191 0.059 -0.667 1.000     
14 Performance-based Contract 0.198 0.399 0.011 0.114 0.032 -0.129 0.099 -0.063 -0.144 -0.131 -0.014 0.040 0.140 -0.452 -0.363 1.000    
15 Partner Integration 0.785 1.006 -0.087 0.194 0.130 -0.134 0.046 0.014 0.265 -0.157 0.253 0.014 -0.143 -0.014 0.084 -0.083 1.000   
16 Cost 7.108 20.687 -0.165 0.140 0.190 -0.062 0.127 -0.055 0.206 -0.210 0.280 -0.131 -0.192 0.052 -0.084 0.035 0.504 1.000  
17 Quality 14.785 21.483 0.024 0.111 0.147 -0.102 0.059 -0.002 0.243 -0.071 0.229 -0.024 -0.063 -0.053 -0.001 0.067 0.422 0.546 1.000 
 
       |ρ| ≥ 0.13 significant at 0.10 level, |ρ| ≥ 0.15 significant at 0.05 level, |ρ| ≥ 0.20 significant at 0.01 level 
 
 
